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The Yalidity of the claims of epistemology depends, like that of any 
other such claim, upon verification. Both Representationists and Perception~ 
ists believe they adequately account for what they maintain. Both verify 
what they hold to be an adequate explanation of valid knowled~e. But both 
cannot be rightJ either one has the true ex~lanation, the other the untrue, 
and Yice versa, or both are wrong. But there is consolation in the fact tha~ 
they do not concur in all details. 
The Representationist holds that t.he perceiTing subject is immediatelr 
aware of only subjective states. These internal objects, states of the mod-
ified self, are present immediately to the Ego. These states, data, modifi-
cations, must have an adequate cause. Since these data have a characteris-
tic of externallity, the cause for them must be external. Only thus indireo• 
tly do we know external objects. 
The Perceptionist, on the other hand, holds that what is immediately 
present to the perceiving subject, is the object being perceived. That the 
self is modified is not denied, but the fact that the self or Ego is immedia• 
~ely aware of this modification, is denied. In other words, the object is 
~erceived directly by means of the process of perception. The object is per-
ceived directly, and not the means by which the object is ~arceivea. 
It is evident that a grave disparity exists between the Representation-
at and the Perceptionist. It remains to be seen how each of these defends 
is respective position. We shall ~ive, in the f.ollo~ing pages, arguments 




Representationistic Appearance of Descartes' Reasoned Realism 
2 
The roots of Representationism, like those of other •non-oonforming•l 
philosophies, may, presumably, be traced to the reasoned realism of Rene 
Descartes. The reason for this accusation, according to some~hinkers. is 
the fact that the existence of ideas is prior to the existence of external 
objeets, as t~e following quotation indicates. Speaking of the qualities 
hardness, heat, light, color, scents, sounds, he says that 
•certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities which 
presented themselves to ~ mind, and which alone I perceived 
properly or immediately, it was not without reason that I be-
lieved mfSelf to perceive objects quite different from Mf 
thought, to wit, bodies from which those ideas proceded;• 
and he continues with a truth not denied by any Scholastic, and very few 
non-Scholastics even find reason to doubt: 
•tor I found by experience that these ideas presented theme 
selves to me without ~ consent being requisite, so that I 
could not perceive any object ••• unless it were present 
to the organs of sense. • • • And because the ideas which 
I received through the senses were much more lively, more 
clear, ••• more distinct than any of those which I could 
of myself frame in meditation,. • • it appeared as though 
they could not have proceded from my mind, so that they 
must necessarily have been produced in me by some other 
things. And having no knowledge of those objects excepting 
the knowledge which the ideas themselves gave me, nothing 
was more likely to occur to my mind than that the objects 
were similar to the ideas which were caused.•2 
In general, the mind, apart from its essence--thinking thing or sub-
stance--has ideas which are clear and distinct(mathematical propositions etc 
1~ By •non-conforming• is meant not in total concord with Moderate Realism 
generally, and Perceptionism specifically. 
2. Meditations on the First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, Med. VI 
Besides these there are those effected by imagination and feeling{he means 
by •feelingft what in Scholastic ters amounts to sense-per?eption), which 
have a characteristic of externality. According to Descartes, these latter 
must be caused by objects external to the body because no better explanation 
is available. It is true that these ideas could have been caused by God. 
But since He 
•has given me no faculty to recognize that this is the case; 
but a very great inclination to believe(that they are sent 
to me or) that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects, 
I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation 
of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than 
corporeal objects.•l 
So we haYe the mind possessing ideas of external reality. The mind 
knows or apprehends only ideas properly and immediatelyf B.y means of these 
ideas the existence of material and external objects is established. This 
is very definitely a representationistio standpoint. 
Mind exists(and in a way functions) independently of matter. Body too• 
is independent of mind. This breach between mind and body does not permit 
of spannin~. Obviously, the mind cannot immediately apprehend external and 
ex~ended reality in any form. Th~refore the logical and inevitable conclu-
sion is that the mind can apprehend directly only its own affections.s 
To discern the remissness of Descartes' theory of knowledge, among 
other things, requires no perspicacity. For a theory of knowledge to be ad .. 
quate and acceptable the gap between the ideal and the real orders must be 
bridged if knowledge is to be of the real order.• 
1. Meditation VI 
2. Meditation VI 
3. New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism, Sister Mary Verda, p.S4 
4. This does not mean that knowledge can be only of external objects. But 
to begin with, all knowledge must be grounded in experience of the exter-
nal world by means of the senses. 
Chapter 2. 
Representationistic Aspects of Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism or Critical Rationalism 
Immanuel Kant's representationism is more obvious if we may use, as i~ 
criminating evidence. some of his own specific statements. The very fact 
that critics generally denominate his philosophy as •transcendental ideal-
ism." more than implies that external reality and subjective states--the re• 
lation between theml.are identified or not adequately accounted for. But 
idealism, as we shall see. is the fate. the inevitable necessity. of any 
philosophy which fails to reconcile the two spheres of reality--extramental 
and intramental realities--and which fails short of explanation of the ori-
gin of the intramental states and their precise relationship with the exter-
nal realm. 
Regarding the knowledge of external objects. which is not knowledge of 
external objects as they are in the~selves, as Perceptionists hold. he says: 
• ••• All our intuition2is nothing but the representation 
of phenomena; that things which we see are not by themselves 
what we see.• so that if we eliminate the subjective form 
of our senses. •all qualities. all relations of objects in 
space and time. nay space and time themselves. would vanish. 
They cannot. as phenomena. exist by themselves, but in us 
only.•S 
And there can be no question as to the meaning he attaches to representa-
tiona: 
•we have representations within us. and can become conscious 
of them; but however far that consciousness may extend. and 
however accurate and minute it may be, yet the representa-
tions are ·always representations only. that is 6 internal 
determinations of our mind.•' · 
1. The relation between subjective states and external reality. 
2. By •intuition• Kant means sense-perception. 
s. Transcendental Aesthetic of Critique of Pure Reason, I. Kant. second 
revised edition of Max Mueller, p.S. 
4. Transcendental Analytic. Critique of Pure Reason, P• 161 
u 
Representations are all we are immediately aware of. And resentfully. 
Kant asks by what right do we add to these representations a reality beyond 
that of the subjectivef By what right has this subjective reality. the rep• 
resentation or phenomenon. any reference to an objective reality! It does 
not have because it cannot have. There is no transcending the subjective 
order. The only objectivity·about any mental phenomenon lies in its being 
universal and necessary. If a representation is judged to be necessary 
(there is really no judging taking place. but merely the spontaneity of con-
cepts is unconsciously set into motion) and universal. then. and only then 
is it objective. 
Prom the way Kant speaks of the object of experience, one would think 
that it has being and existence external to the mind. The contrary. howeY~ 
is true. The object is what the mind makes it to be. For instance. he says 
that intuition is possible only when the object is given. "And the object 
can be given only through a certain affection of the mind.•1 He starts out 
well, and ends lamentably. 
And then the synthesis of sense experience. In the function or forma-
tion of sense-intuitions synthesis is used. The synthesis is in the sense 
that ~it signifies the function whereby the mind unconsciously applies an an 
a priori form or category to a datum. and thus constitutes ~experience by 
constructing an object of knowledge.•2 
We can see by careful analysis that perception is perception of nothing. 
The noumenon is not perceived. What is perceived is what the mind adds to 
1. Transcendental Aesthetic 
2. Epistemology, Peter Coffey, p.lBl. Vol. 1. 
the •manifold• of experience from its store of a priori forms. Immediate 
awareness is possible only of the representation or phenomenon. 
That Kant has reversed, theoretically, the process of knowledge, he 
openly admits: 
"Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must 
conform to the objects: but, under that supposition, all 
attempts to establish anything about them a priori, by 
means of concepts, and thus to enlarge our knowledge, have 
come to nothing. The experiment therefore ought to be made, 
whether we should not succeed bet+er with the problems of 
metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must conform to 
our mode of cognition.•l 
v 
So we see, that if the categories, the a priori forms, must be eliminated if 
the mind is to conform to objects, and if they be firmly established by ob-
jects conforming to them, then the latter alternative must be accepted and 
maintained at all costs for the sake of the a priori forms. 
In Kant's epistemology there is indeed conformity. Something conforms 
to something else. But let us see what this is. He perceived the futility 
of denying conformity of some sort. Conformity was essential to knowledge, 
and valid knowledge at that. Now he is unable to trenscend the ego, the 
subjective self, in order to posit the conformity of Perceptionists. There-
fore there remained no other alternative than the fullowing. There were twe 
elements in his knowledge, namely mind and its phenomena. If mind construa8e 
the objects of knowledge, and this according to constructive principles, the~ 
it is natural that there be some correspondence between object and its source 
which source is the constructiye mind. At any rate, the conformity in Kant'1 
2 
epistemology is the one of mental appearances or phenomena to mind. It shoull 
1. Supplement II, P• 693, Critique, Mueller 1 s 2nd revised edition. 
2. Epist., Coffey, Vol. I, P• 197. Also see : The Philosophy of Kant by 
John Watson, P• 3. 
be clear that whatever qualities--primary or secondary--objects have. the 
mind has endowed the objects with those particular qualities. and they are 
all that the mind can be immediately conscious or aware of. 
Kant advances the following argument to prove that we cannot know ob-
jects directly. 
•It phenomena were things by themselves(these things-by-them-
selves are objects of direct perception for Scholastics, i. 
e. those of them who are Perceptionists). the succession of 
the representations of their manifold would never enable us 
to judge how that manifold is connected in the objects.•l 
This statement is.in entire accord with the later representationists--
J. G. Vance and Roy Wood Sellars--who maintain that we do not perceive the 
object directly because of the manifold and various impressions of the same 
object on consciousness through the senses. We shall deal with these later. 
In Kant's theory of cognition, knowledge is of a mind-created object.2 
7 
There is no possibility of any knowledge beyond what takes place in the mind. 
Immediate awareness. therefore, must be of mind products, which in turn are 
attributed to objects. This is clearly a representationistic tenet. The 
representation is of an object. but not a representation in any way similar 
to the quality of an external object. The representation'is attributed to 
an extramental object, and the object becomes no more nor less than what is 
attributed to it. In other words, the mind, by means of the a priori con-
cepts, gives the being t o the noumenon. which being it creates for it,(by 
~eing is here meant qualities, all qualities perceivable by the senses. in-
diYidually and collectively). Thus, Kant. in a sense, may be classed as a 
!.Transcendental Analytic, P• 155. 
2. Epistemology, Coffey, Vol. 1. PP• 185-186. 
Representationist. and in every sense. a rationalist in whose theory a pri-
ori concepts, innate principles of the pure understanding. occupy a positio~ 
of prime importance. 
0 
Chapter 3. 
Physical Representationism of Thomas Case 
Physical representationism is the theory of Thomas Case contained in 
his Book: Physical Realism. This theory is based, from ber,inni~g to end, 
upon current theories of the physical sciences. Science is "F~owledge at 
its best•, and alone is equal to tAe task of disclosing to us the real na-
ture of the qualities of external objects. 
Physical Realism proceeds in a manner similar to the following: Exter-
nal objects reveal themselves to us by affecting the organism. Immediately 
apprehended is not the extramental object as it is, but the effect of the 
object on the physical organism. That the object really i.e. actually as a 
physical. extended. extramental entity, exists, this science assures us. 
The effect of the object takes place within the organism, since the 
internal alone is immediately apprehended. And the physical realist is con-
strained to reason thus: •that since only internal processes can be ap~re-
hended directly and immediately, the objects existing in the world, and the 
woril itself, must be inferred from this internal data.•l 
Now these internal data or "effects•, the direct ohjeets of ~pprehen-
sion, the objects of which alone there is immediate awareness, are not pay-
chical in nature. The discoveries of science compel the physical realist 
to so conclude. These effects, qualities of objects, are states of the 
perceiver's organism. And from these the existence of the external world 
is deduced and posited. 
•Holding to the logical principle that an inference can pass 
only to what is similar in kind. these internal sensible 
l.New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism. Sister WAry Verja, p.59 
r 
data from which external objects are scientifically infer• 
red must be physical, not psychical; otherwise effect and 
cause would be dissimilar.•l 
Since the cause is physical, the effect must be, according to the principle 
of similarity of effect to cause. And we are immediately aware of the ef• 
feet, not of the cause, the external object. We immediately perceive the 
effect, the nervous system modified by an external reality. In other words• 
we perceive the effect and infer the cause, the actual physical being. The 
inconsistency here should be obvious. The actual ob,iect, the cause of the 
effect, is extra-mental. But so is the nervous system as modified and of 
which modified nervous system the subject is i~~ediately aware, extramental~ 
Physical realism, as related to theory of knowledge, is reducible to 
physical representationism, and this because of two reasons. The firet is 
the presumption that the physical, the material, alone is real because of 
science 1 s attestations. The second is that the direct object of immediate 
apprehension is the effect of the(and direct effect) physical existent ex-
ternal to the self. Now since the cause is physical the effect can be only 
physical. And this similarity in constitution of cause to effect, is more 
than the external object to the phantasm in Scholastic philosophy. By this 
we mean that the similarity in physical content between effect and cause of 
the physical realist, and phantasm and the external object of the Scholas-
tic, are not identical. In the former the two elements are much more physi-
cal than in the latter. If nothing more, this is at least strongly implied. 
Disregarding the details, the physically representationistic propensitl 
of Thomas Case is evident, and will become more so after we have considered 
some contemporary representatives of representationism. 
1. New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism, Sister Mary Verda, PP• 59-60. 
2. Epistemology, Coffey, Vol. II, PP• 125-26. 
Chapter 4. 
Science Ushers in Contemporary Representationism 
We have seen that representationism is for the most part due to the • 
progress of science. Its(science's) discoveries and conceptions have exer-
cised considerable influence on philosophic thought. But to visualize this 
influence better it will be well for us to consider some pertinent state-
menta of one or two scientists themselves, before we commence to evaluate 
contemporary representationism, or, what might appropriately be termed 
magnanimous idealism. 
The first of the scientists we have in mind is no less a personage tha 
the physicist, Ernst Mach. He devoted much time to the analysis of sensa-
tiona, and finally, in an epitomized form, published the volume: The Con-
tributions to the Analysis of Sensations, which embodies the principle phil 
osophical ideas of the author as a scientist. 
Ernst Mach begins with the assumption that the •ego• exists for •mere 
practical necessity.•l Then, •Thing, body, matter, are nothing apart from 
their complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth--nothing apart from their 
so-called attributes.•2 Thus attributes as mental symbols make up things, 
bodies, matter, reality etc. Then, • • • • the world consists only of our 
sensations •••• we have knowledge only of sensations.•3 And, • ••• all 
bodies are but thought-symbols for complexes of sensations.•4 In one state-
ment he says that bodies are •thought-symbols• and in another he goes on to 
say that •sodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations 
(complexes of elements) rr~ke up bodies.• But a fair idea of his theory may 
1. Critical Realism by R.W. Sellars, p.29. Scientific progress consists in 
ten~ing towards thinking things and away from perceiving them. In other 
words, direct concern is with what is within mind. "Science does not 
deal with sensible qualities, but with quantities and causal relations.• 
!I'" 
~--------------------------------------------------~ 
be gathered from the quotation: 
•we eee "'"' object ~aving a point s. If we touch S, that is, 
bring it into connection with our body, we receive a prick. 
We can see S, without feeling the prick. But as soon as 
we feel the prick we find s. The visible point, therefore 
is a permanent fact or nucleus, to which the prick is an-
nexed according to circumstances, as something accidental. 
From the frequency of such occurrences we ultimately accus-
tom ourselves to regard all properties of bodies as •effec-
ts proceeding from permanent nuclei and conveyed to the 
ego through the medium of the body; which effects we call 
sensations.•! 
The representationism here, though founded on contradiction, seems to 
be as follows: The visible point of a needle is a permanent fact or nucleus. 
This needle is a needle whether it punctures the epidarmis of my finger or 
not. The pain felt when the finger is pierced is an accident, it is not a 
quality of the needle, but the affected nerve in ~ finger; and this is all 
I can know--the affected nerve. T~is illustration is typical of every hu-
man experience. All we are immediately aware of is effect; the cause, ·of 
course, must exist. All human experiences are effects, complexes of sensa-
tions. lmmedi~te awareness, apprehension, is of these solely. 
The conclusion is that the external world is always determined or con-
ditioned by the body. To changes in the body correspond changes in the ext-
ernal world. Modified physical organism means substantially modified object 
perceived.2 The principle of causality explains this particular interpreta-
tion: only the effect is actually and directly perceivable and perceived. 
And by this effect the cause is mediately or indirectly perceived. And from 
this is concluded that all effects are qualities of objects. 
The representationism of Ernst Mach is evident, although it is less 
1. Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations, PP• 9 and 10 
2. Idem, PP• 8-10 
11 
physical than that of the physical realist. As we shall see, representation• 
ism becomes less physical, and gradually continues in that trend until it 
wases identical with idealism, or better, magnanimous idealism. 
Ernst Mach's representationism is less physical bece.use, it seel'ls, t,he 
effect, the complex of sensation, is less similar to the cause. The example 
of the needle and the pricked finger illustrates well. When my finger is 
pierced I feel pain. This complex of sensation cannot be found, as such, in 
the needle, although the needle caused it. Instead of saying that this rep-
resentationism is leas physical, a more appropriate designation would be to 
term it-the representationism--as less similar, if at all, to the cause, in 
contrast to the precision in similarity of effect to cause in the represen-
tionism of Thomas Case. 
Before closing, we must note one grave error in lmch 1 s proceedure. 
Speaking of the sharp object, he says: •we see an object having a point s.• 
This certainly implies direct and immediate perception of this object. It 
seems to indicate that the object is known and perceived, and not, as he 
maintains, the sensation of perception. There is nothing to indicate, on 
seeing this particular object, that the perception, the sensation, the com-
plex of sensation, is directly perceived and the caused inferred. 
Whatever be the final judgment, we may conclude that Mach's representa-
tions are less similar to their causes than the representations of Case. In 
the former, pain ought to exist in the perceiving subject. The pain is caus• 
ed by a needle. In the latter(Case), if followed through logically, the pah 
the sudden discomfort, ought to exist in the needle. 
Another representative scientist we wish to note is A. s. Eddington. 
We shall treat of him in the following chapter. 
r 
Chapter s. 
Representationism of Arthur Stanley Eddington More Emphatic 
We have in A. S. Eddington what naturally results from a scientist sud-
denly turning philosopher. He holds that when 
•an image or sensation arises in the brain• it "cannot purport 
to resemble the stimulus which excites it. Everything known 
about the material world must in one way or another have been 
inferred from these stimuli transmitted among the nerves." 
In order to arrive at knowledge, 
"The mind as a central receiving station reads the dots and 
dashes of the incoming nerve-signals. By frequent repeti-
tion of their call-aignals the various transmitting stations 
of the outside world become familiar. We begin to feel 
quite a homely acquaintance with 2LO and SXX. But a broad-
casting station is not like its call-signals; there is no 
commensurability in their nature.• 
This, it should b"' clee.r. :i.s identical with what Ernst Mach convincedly pro-
poses. And then he ~tinues: 
•so too the chatia and tables around us which broadcast to 
us incessantly those signals which affect our sight and 
touch cannot in their nature be like unto the signals or 
to the sensations which the signals awake at the end of 
their journey.~ 
Here too, we have causes and effects. The extended object external to the 
perceiving subject "incessantly• is making impressions upon the senses. 
These extramental objects only "broadcast ••• signals• which are unlike the 
object sending them. The •stirring of consciousness• by sensation and by 
image, and r~sulting in knowledge. only •transmutes the whole• of nature's 
•stor7•.2 We are far from being immediately conscious of what nature is en-
deaYouring, by its broadcasts, to actually communicate. What is received is 
1. Science and the Unseen World, A. S. Eddington, pp.34-36 
2. Idem, P• 38 
so distorted that it disfigures the real; no resemblance exists between the 
object and what it produces in the organism. 
This is the world science reveals: 
•That environment of space and time and matter. of light and 
colour and concrete things. which seems so vividly real to 
us is probed deeply by every device of physical science and 
at the bottom we reach symbols.~l 
Again we have here relegated to imwediate apprehension what is revealed 
upon introspection and reflection only. Reflection. reflection alone. 
shows that the process of cognition exists. ·The object is known by means 
of sensation, but the se~s~tion ~ever reaches the level of consciousness 
where it becomes object of immediate awareness. 2 
Science has made many valuable contributions to every field of endea-
vour. But it has added very little, if anything, to theory of knowledge. 
When we perceive objects we still perceive them directly. Neither the ob-
ject nor the subject have been changed by discoveries of modern science. 
We continue to apprehend immediately and perceive directly. 
1. Science and the Unseen World. A. S. Eddington, P• 37. 
2. Elements of Epistemolo~• J. T. B~rron, pp. 106-107 
r 16 
III 
THE REPRESENTATIONI~M OP C~ITICAL ~~ALISM 
Chapter 1. 
Representationism of Roy Wood Sellars 
Critical Realism is a contemporary school of philosophy, which, we 
might say, is the natural result of scientific progress. Scientific disco.-
aries have dissuaded modern non-conforming philosophers to such an extenl 
as to reject idealism together with intuitive realism, e.nd to propound a Yia 
media, which of course amounts to nothing short of objective idealism(by ob-
jective idealism here is meant: all the ego can know im~'Jediately is the sub-
jective state which is the effect of an extramental cause). We shall now 
attempt to present this via media, or representationism proper. 
We have seen that A. S. Eddington held that perception was of signs or 
symbols. That is the word of a scientist. Now Sellars agrees and says that 
science perceives only signs or symbols which require conceptual interpre-
tation. •science does not deal with sensible qualities, but with quantities 
and causal relations." He remarks that scientists are pretty generally agree• 
that things as perceived are different from what lies behind the perception 
or appearance.1 In other words, we are aware of perception directly, but 
not of object. • ••• perception is a mediate process and not an event in 
which the thing is revealed as it is." And as criticism of Natural Realism 
he says: Natural Realism is "not a theory of what takes place, but a state-
ment of what appears to take place.• •natural Realism is the philosophy 
dominant even among philosophers when they are not in a reflective mood.•2 
The Natural Realist is in error because perception is a mediate process. 
1. Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, P• 41. 
2. Idem, PP• 1-6. 
r 
But we shall see that the "reflective mood" adds nothing to perception: it 
only brings to light what is never perceived. But the question under dis-
cussion is not what reflection reveals, but what is perceived. 
17 
His foremost argument against Natural Realism is the fact that •Percep-
tion has conditions which do not appear in that which is i~nediately percei~ 
ed.•1 Therefore perception is not valid, but very fallible. Such a conten-
tion is ordinarily not expected of a philosopher. If our senses revealed 
all conditions, all qualities, and every possible percept the object is cap• 
able of conditioning(this of course is not direct), there would be no need 
for our higher faculties. 
Of no meagre importance, with Sellars, is •The lack of concommittant 
variation between percepts and things.• By lack of •ooncommittant variatioD 
he has in mind the fact that at a distance of a few feet I perceive an objet 
of a certain size. At a much greater distance this same object is perceived 
much smaller. In other words the variation in ~ percepts does not corres-
pond to the object. because the object does not vary, while my percepts do. 
Professor Stout is quoted as exemplyfying this thus: •If anything X 
exhibits variations which are not shared by Y, X and Y must be distinct ex-
istences."! But Mr. Sellars frustrates his position by the following count-
eractiont •we constantly have to discount our percepts by means of past ex-
perience in order not to be misled." But we must be misled because past 
experience toe is by percept, or appearance, or dependent upon them. But 
he continues: "There can be no doubt that we must go beyond present physical 
1. Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, p. 7. 
2. Idem, p. 12. 
stimuli to account for percepts. The past is somehow active, and the past 
is peraona1.•1 If the past is personal, how can we avoid being misled? This 
avoidance is impossible; deception is inevitable. 
To discount appearances. percepts, by reference to the past, implies 
the existence of a real, actual something in the past that is not an appear-
ance. Certainly, to discount appearance by appearance is no more acceptable 
than the acceptance of the last appearance as true. 
And in this same trend of thought, insisting that the present percept. 
in order to become veridical, must be compared with the past: •Truth, so far 
as the percept is concerned, lies behind us instead of hefore us."2 But this 
we have indicated to be erroneous. 
However, he endeavours to substantiate the tenet that the percept par-
takes of truth only after having been discounted by the percepts of the past 
(He does not say that the present percept is discounted by a past percept, 
but this is strongly implied). 
Only qualities of objects, which qualities •lend themselves to mathe-
matical and physical analysis" are capable of being described and explained 
accurately. "The primary dimensions of things and processes, such as exten-
sion, movement, mass and energy, can be used for the purpose of exact des-
cription and explanation because they are measurable and lend themselves to 
mathematical and physical analysis. For this reason results can be obtainea 
which are not variable from moment to moment as is the case with ·Lhe secon-
dary qualities."! This is very similar to the earnest contention of T. Case! 
~, Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, p.27. In this connection is rertinent 
r.ew ryealism in the Light of Scholasticism, Sister M.Verda. 
1. Crit. Real. R.W.Sellars, PP• 12-16. 
z. Idem, p. 16. 
But wherefrom invariable results? Every sort o~ scienti~io experience is 
based on perception, thing-experiences. But these are appearances, and 
appearances are not to be relied upon. The percepts are objects of immedi-
ate awareness; but percepts are unstable. 
That the primary qualities are stable and measurable. is due to sense 
perception directly revealing the object perceived. If the secondary qual-
ities are not stable, neither are the primary. He relegates the secondary 
qualities to the personal side, qualities perceived with the "perceptual 
perspective." But he does not evade the fact that qualities. whether prim-
ary or secondary, are founded on direct perception. 
The principle of causality is employed to account for the effects dire• 
ctly perceived: "• •• things are there where we judge them to be; 
but we do not perceive them. Instead, we perceive 
the percepts causally connected with them. a.nd these 
percepts are spatially and temporally more directly 
related to the brain than to the things with which 
we ordinarily identify them.~l 
As for the percept being real, and apprehension of extramental object 
being direct,--these are impossibilities if •to be real is to be susceptible 
of being perceived or of affecting that which is susceptible of being per-
ceived.•2 In other words everything must be real that the human being cannot 
reach. Reality is inapproachable to the percipient subject. The represen-
tationism here portrayed should be evident. 
We w~st conclude that Professor Sellars is both scientist and philoso-
pher. This seems to be a disparagement to either pretention. To attain to 
the truth which any branch of knowledge has to offer, invariably specializ-
ation is required. Otherwise the Adage: "Jack of all trades, master of non• 
is worthless, devoid of meaning and application. 
1. Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, P• 14. 
2. Idem, p. 29. 
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Chapter 2. 
Instrumentalism of Jehn Dewey is Representationistic 
To leave no doubt as to the scientific influence. basis. of represen-
tationism. the philosophy of a scientist • as specifically related to 
theory of knowledge. ot the calibre of John Dewey must be mentioned. 
With John Dewey •consciousness ••• denotes awareness or perception 
of meanings.• The subject-matter of awareness is things in process of 
change. Awareness means attention to events taking place in mind. Objects 
are •events-with-meanings." His representationism is vivid in the follow-
ing: Real objects •signify the cause of certain qualitative and immediate 
effects.• The instrumenta1istic rapresentationism is contained in: •. . . 
things • • • that later come to be known. are primarily not objects of 
awareness. but causes of weal and woe. things to get. others to avoid." 
He too. uses the principle of c~usel:'i.ty: •The conscious or perceived affair 
is itself a consequence of antecedent conditions.•1 ~e are immediately 
aware of an effect in the mind. This effect is caused by an extramenta1 
object. There is not so much a relation of effect to cause. as there is of 
the effect to future action. What we immediately apprehend is the cause 
of action to be experienced. Direct and immediate apprehension of eztra-
mental entities is not to be found in Instrumentalism. 
1. The Philosophy of John Dewey. Joseph Ratner 
Essays in Experimental Logic. pp. 94-95. 176-118. 




Final Consideration of Representationism 
The representationist claims that what makes us feel we are in direct 
contact with external reality in perception, is •curious pertinacious biasR, 
•unconscious objective biasK, •natural objective bias•, •strong pathetic 
belief."l John G. Vance says that only a group of sensations is immediate-
ly given. He maintains: 
"I look outward, inward, upward and find no more than sensations, 
feelings, thoughts, desires, or imagery of some kind--all 
psychic events at best. What am I to myself, in fact, but 
an ever-changing group of psychic occurrences!•2 
We are aware of sensations and other states of mind. Beyond these we 
cannot reach: 
"Beyond these phenomena, of sensation and thought, whether 
they be reliable or not, or what comes to the same, beyond 
the presentational order we may never pass. Without hinting 
obliquely at any Kantian limitation of knowledge it is 
cleaer that we may never !Row more of things than we find 
within our consciousness.• 
He struggles to avoid idealism, but this is impossible if subject is direct-
ly aware only of his mental states. 
In final analysis, Representationism holds: knowledge is a three term 
relation. There must be a subject; there is an object; and between these 
two there is what they designate "datum", "essence", logical, •neutral 
entity,• and "character-complex.• 
1. Reality and Truth, John G. Vance, pp. 1-3 
2. Idem, p. 14. 
3. Idem, P• 166. 
•Perception is, ••• imagining character-complexes out there in the 
world, together with an implicit attribution of existence.•1 In perception 
•we do • • • immediately grasp or apprehend • • • outer objects. But it 
is a logical, essential, virtual grasp.•2 Therefore there can be ne uirect 
apprehension of object. This does not mean that the apprehension is of a 
mental state. The mental state has ontological existence. The datum has 
none. •There do exist, in or in intimate connection ~ith the ~rain, a 
series of "mental states,• which have the qualities which make our data 
appear.•~ The datum is not the mantel state. It cannot be because mental 
states vary with individuals; essences, data, character-complexes do not. 
c. A. Strong interestingly elaborates on the datum: 
" ••• the datum is the logical essence of the real thing. 
By •essence• I mean its~ divorced from its ~--its 
entire concrete nature, including its sensible character, 
but not its existence.•4 
The data are not actual external existences; they are not internal or 
psychical existences "either representative of the external ones or non--
representative.• They are logical entities and not "identifiable with 
the things we perceive, but are only the detached concrete natures or 
•essences• of those things.•5 
1. Essays in Critical Realism by Durant Drake, Arthur o. Lovejoy, 
James B. Pratt, Arthur Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, 
and C. A. Strong. p. 23 
z. Idem, p. 2&. 
3. Idem, P• 26 
4. Idem, 
5. Idem, PP• 223-224; 
Descartes held primary qualities to be extramentally real, while 
of secondary qualities he had "confused and obscure" ideas. Coffey, 
Epistemology, Vol. II, PP• 139-140. 
•nata are presentments of objects from the point of view of the organ-
ism, they are not objects themselves.•1 "In short, when we speak of any-
thing as a •datum," that which makes it a datum, the giveness, is not given 
along with the thing. It is an external denomir1ation, it consists in a 
relation between the thing given and something else.•2 Somewhere in 
between the giveness and awareness lies the datum. There is no direct 
contaot either between object and datum or awareness and object. 
Professor Strong holds that if the datum were existent, an epistem-
ological dualism would be unavoidable. The datum must be continuously 
existent: if the datum were not continuously existent, we would have 
representationism, says Professor Strong. 
Data are not existences, but universals, the bare natures of objects. 
Since they are universals, they can have only one existence. As far as 
the percipient subject is concerned, all he does is affirms the existence 
of real things. The universal is a sort of continuum the existence of 
which the subject recognizes. 
Joseph Thomas Barron comments on the datum: 
"The datum is the essence(or character-complex) which through 
perception is taken to be a character of the perceived ob-
ject. The latter causes the appearance of certain charac-
ter-complexes in the percipient subject. These character 
complexes are the data--the objects of lwareness in the 
percipient subject--which are projected 3 by the subject into 
the extramental wjrld, or which are imagined to be in the 
objective world." 4 
1. Essays in Critical Realism by Durant Drake et al. P• 226 
2. Idem, p. 228. This ~something else" is the subject e~o, or "I•. 
3. By projected is meant recognized or the "real" thing affirmed. 
4. Elements of Epistemology, J.T. Barron, PP• 161-162 •. 
And if perception is to be true, these data must be identical with the 
qualities of the perceived object. 
Error in perception is due to the fact that data are dependent on the 
individual organism. The data Yary •in their character with the consti-
tution of the sense-organs and the way in which these are affected." Only 
secondarily and indirectly are data affected by the external object. The 
follofing quotation illucidates: 
• ••• We have no power of penetrating to the object itself 
and intuiting it immediately, but are dependent for our infor-
mation concerning it on the effects which it is able to pro-
duce within the body. In a word, data are subject to the 
law of psychophysical correlation.•l 
Thus we see that the datum obstructs direct perception of the external 
universe. T"le ex~erne,l object of perception becomes the Kantian noumenon 
and the object perceived becomes only the content of perception. 
If all that the percipient subject is immediately conscious of is the 
appearance or representation, how does he know that it is an appearance or 
a representation? If this is followed logically, the answer is negative--
he can never know. And if from immediate awareness of psychic states, we 
infer, by principle of causality, existence of a real ceuse, en extramen-
tal world, how can this be established? The answer again must be negative--
it cannot be established. The best that can be done is to hold(if the sub-
ject or ego is immediately aware of conscious states, psychic events) that 
the self or ego causes them. How can I know the cause to be external if I 
never perceive dir&ctly, or immediately apprehend, the object of which I ~ 
i~ediately aware? If I am aware or apprehend directly, only of data within 
1. Essays in Critical Realism, D. Drake et al., p. 225 
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me. the only explanation. i.e. logical explanation, is that the present 
data were caused by ~self, the ego or aelf. But the representationist 
firmly cnnt.ends th~t the representation is not of the subject's creation. 
It is solely experience from which we learn t.hat effects must be 
produced by causes. that effects are similar to the causes which produce 
them. And this experience is direct perception, i.e. causes and effects 
have their foundation in direct apprehension ot external objects. If not, 
then the •self" constructs appea.rances or representations, of which the 
self is directly conscious. 
Just why do the representationists deny the self-evident facts of 
perception? The reason is the lack of "concommittant variation• between 
the object as it is and the percepts of the object as experienced by the 
perceiving subject. They are willing to accept immediate perception if 
changeable perceptions of the same object can be accounted for. (They are 
aware of the irrefragability of the senses. What they need is a correct 
interpretation of the facts science presents. This PERCEPTIONISM!, as far 
as is possible w:ith the discoveries of science. the constitution of the 
human organism, and the ability of the human mind to interpret to the 
extent feasible. adequately does. In the following pages we shall present 
the more evident views of the theory of PERCEPTIONISM, and shall endeavor 
to show the futility of such a theory as RZPRESENTATIONISM, and the need-






For the sake of convenient comparison we present here in summarized 
form the salient features of Pepresentationism. Representc.tionism is the 
theory maintaining 
"that the non-Ego, as distinct from the Ego, is not a prim-
itive datum of consaious e.wareness; that only the Ego is 
apprehended first and immediately; that from its data there 
is evolved and mediated a conscious discrimination or distinc-
tion between a non-Ego and the Ego, and a spontaneous belief 
in the distinct reality of the former. This position is 
variously described as Representationism, or the Theory of 
Mediate or Representative or Inferential Sense Perception.•! 
External reality produces a mental image or what is known as a representa-
tion, in the subject perceiving. Tr.e image is immediately present to con-
sciousness. Apprehension is directly of this representation(or image). 
lind external reality is perceived through this representation. 2 In other 
words, external reality is mirrored, represented in representation, and 
by inference from the representation, external reality is established as 
existent. This extended, external reality is apprehended through the in-
ternal data or objects of direct awareness. This subjective data is referr• 
ed to the real qualities and Mt.ure of re~Hty by the principle of causal-
ity and the principle of similarity of effect to cause. The mind, of 
course, does this referrin,. This, in general, is what Representationism 
ardently proferrs as substitute for both idealism and intuitive realism. 
f!e see in this mediate perception that the object does not, at any time 
reach the level of consciousness, is never directly apprehended. The sub-
ject is immediately aware of data, which result from the process of percep-
1. and 2. See following page. 
tion. The data are the means by which the objeet is known. But the 
data are apprehended directly. and the object indirectly. Knowledge of 
object is solely what is inferred from the medium or data. 
1. Epistemology, Peter Coffey, Vol. II, p. 40. 
2. Idem, p. 66. 
~· 
Chapter 2. 
The Theory of Perceptionism 
rereeptionism is the theory of immediate or intuitional or presen-
tative perception. According to this theory 
"the species sensibilia expressa, the whole mental modifi-
cation and process, with its resulting state or condition, 
is only the means by which the external thing is directly 
presented to and consciously apprehended by the perceiver: 
the process is not constructive of a mental object which 
would be itself first apprehended, and in and through which, 
as an image or representation, the represented external 
reality would be mediately apprehended. The mente.l or 
psychic effect of the action of the external reali t.y on the 
mind, and of the mental reaction thereto, does not itself 
come into consciousness or become an object of direct awara-
ness.111 
This "psychic effect" exists, but it reaches consciousness only upon 
reflection and introspection. It is only the means which enables the 
subject to apprehend the object directly. In the act of perception, 
excluding the possible immediate awareness of phantasms or ment.8.1 
images, "it.is the external reality itself(i.e. some phase or aspect of 
it) that is ••• immediately present to, and apprehended by, the per-
ceiver."2 
The chief argument against this theory, of the representationist, 
is that direct perception of the qualities(whether primary or secondary) 
cannot be direct for the reason that: sense qualities exist only in the 
subject because the object perceived produces "vibratory motions of the 
air or aether" which the subject apprehends immediately as qualities of 
the object, using the principle of causality to substantiate the con-
1. ~pistemology, ~eter Coffey, Vol.!!, P• 66. 
2. Idem, P• 67. 
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tention. These "vibratory motions of the air or aether" stimulate the 
human organism, resulting in data denominated as representations of 
qualities of extramental reality by the principle of causality. The 
physical effect of these vibrations is what the subject perceives as 
the several qualities of external objects. The data or representations 
of qualities in the extra-subjective realm of existence, are •specifi-
cally determined in the perceiver by the influence of the external 
reality." But the real proper and common sensibles as determining the 
actually existent object external to the subject, are not univocal wihh 
the data or representations. But they ~ analogous to the external 
qualities because the data •are cognitive representations produced in 
the mind by the external material qualities.• If this be so, the 
actual qualities existing in the external object independently of per-
ception, must, in Kant's sense, be noumena--things-in-themselves--which 
forever remain unknowable. To cite Jeanniere for specific exemplifi-
cation, we have: 
"A thing cannot be known by the (consciously, directly appre-
hended) impression it produces; for (a) the impression is 
not the thing; (b) nor is it an effect that faithfully ex-
presses(or represents or mirrors) the thing; for (c) it is 
an effect received by(or wrought in) the(conscious) subject 
and received conformably with the mode of being of the lat-
ter(secundum modum recipientis). Wherefore there is no 
relation of resemblance between the impression and the thing.•l 
With the perceptionist •resumblance• between object and phantasm, or 
between object and idea, is revealed upon reflection and introspection. 
In perception there is no resemblance. The object is perceived directly 
and apprehended simultaneously; apprehension and perception are direct 
1. Quotation from Jeanniere in Epistemology by P• Coff'ey, P• 72. 
and immediate. 
The perceptionist holds that when an object is before him, and his 
faculty of perception is normal (abiding by the laws of perspective), he 
perceives the object directly and immediately. He is conscious of the 
object directly. He does not deny the existence of media. The air or 
aether exists and intervenes. It may be vibrating too. But that does 
not alter perception any. Then there is the existence of the datum. 
But the datum or phantasm or image, does not make perception indirect or 
mediate. The air, the phantasm, and all else existing and brought into 
existence during perception,(e.g. the affected nervous system, the 
brain etc.)--these the subject does not become aware of until he reflects. 
He is aware directly and immediately of the object. 
The datum of the Representationist exists likewise for the Percep-
tionist. But the datum(whether vibratory motions of the air or aether. 
or affected nervous system. or change in perspective of the object 
perceived). is not directly and immediately perceived. That the datum 
exists, who will deny? But that it exists as object of immediate aware• 
ness. the perceptionist firmly and justifiably denies. The facts of 
perception present to immediate awareness, or in immediate apprehension, 
the object as it is. Wh.en I see a red apple, it is a red apply I am 
immediately aware of; I apprehend immediately a red apple. The medium 
by which I apprehend the red apple immediately. exists. But it does not 
reach the point of consciousness until I reflect upon the medium. I am 
not aware of the medium until I reflect upon it. What I am directly 
and immediately conscious or aware of is the red apple. Upon reflecting 
I find that a medium exists and plays its part during the process of per-
caption. I find that during the process of perception the medium is the 
means by which I immediately and directly apphrend or perceive the red 
apple. 
If the perceptionist can account re,.srm .. bly and accurately for 
absence of •concommittant variations• in certain perceptions(this absence 
of "concommittant variations" is the fundamental argument of the repre-
sentationist against both idealism and presentative realism). he nullifies 
the chief contention of mediate perceptionists. and tota.lly destroys 
faith in representationism. Thii the perceptionist does with facility 
simply by appealing to reason with the facts available. 
On perceiving a straight stick lying on the ground. I spontaneous-
ly judge it to be a straight stick because the sense presents it so. I 
perceive a straight stick. Now this same stick immersed partly in water 
appears crooked. I immediately judge it to be crooked, because it so 
appears. Yet I know the stick is straight. This is what the represen-
tationist cannot account for: the same stick appearing straight at one 
time, crooked at another time. 
The answer to this spurious difficul+y iA th~t there are conditions 
in perception which must be taken into account. 
•Reflection on the facta of sense experience, on our spon-
taneous judgments regarding the immediate data of sense, 
and particularly on the occasional illusions or deceptions 
or erroneous interpretations of which we are the victims. 
convinces us that we can rely on these spontaneous judgments 
only when the whole conscious process takes place under nor-
mal conditions, and that we can, by attending to the actual 
conditions. either at the time or at least by reflection 
after the fact, either forestall or correct erroneous 
spontaneous interpretations. These conditions are partly 
on the side of the perceiver and partly on the side of 
the perceived datum or object.•l 
And the requisite conditions are: a) the perceiver must be mentally and 
physically in a sane and healthy condition. He must be able to distin-
'uish between datum of perception and datum of imagination. The sense 
organ must be free from disturbing and abnormal conditions. in order to 
present datum as it is presentable under normal conditione. b) The 
external datum: spatial and physical conditions of object under per-
ception. and the same conditions of the medium between object and 
percipt.ion agent or percipient subject must be normal. These condi-
tions are essential if perception is to be perception of what actually 
is. If conditions do not change. the perception of a straight stick 
will be always a straight stick. It is obvious that a straight stick 
lying on the ground at one moment. and then immersed in water at ano-
ther moment. cannot appear the same under the varying conditions. 
The stick is the same. but the conditions are not constant. This 
sufficiently accounts for the much preached absence of •conoommittant 
variation.• 
Our perceptions of an object are not necessarily always the same. 
fhe very fact that senses are used prohibits identical perceptions of 
an identical object. The sense organs determine percept.ion to e con-
siderable extent. 
But if perception is determine« by conditions of the subject's 
sense organs, now can the senses report truth, i.e. how can the percept 
correspond to the object of which it is the percept? The answer is 
1. Epistemology, Peter Coffey, Vol. II, PP• 95-96. 
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contained ina 
•when all the conditions of an actual external perception 
are normal. the qualities of the presented sense datum can 
be rightly affirmed of the perceived external reality. in-
asmuch as those qualities are qualities of this reality 
as normally presented to consciousness. It does not imply 
that those qualities, presented to consciousness. are whol-
ly independent of the determining influence of the sense 
organs. It recognizes that in all perception the quali• 
ties of the presented sense datum are partially determined 
to be what they are by the organic nature or structure and 
conditions of the perceiver's own material or corporeal 
sense organs. through the instrumental functions of which 
the external reality is presented to the individual perceiv-
er1s consciousness.•l 
The following sentences are ~xtremely important to the solution of 
the problem which sense-organic-determinations of datum bring about: 
•But when these organic determining factors. on the subjec-
tive or •salt• side of the process, are normal. and. bei~g 
normal. are the same for all normal individual perceivers. 
their determining influence on the qualities of the exter-
nal reality presented through their operation is not indeed 
denied. for it is undeniabl•, but is tacitly and rightly 
ignored as being something essentially involved in the sub-
jective, organic side of the presentation of external re~l­
ity to the perceiver's mind or consciousness. Hence the 
individual perceiver abstracts from this presupposed, uni-
form influence of his own organic nature as a sentient being. 
on the reality which he perceives, when he ••• judges this 
reality to be as it is presented.•2 
In other words, the continuous and normal influence of the organism, 
influence experienced by all normal individuals, upon the datum may be 
•ignored•. Thus perception is valid in spite of the determining in-
fluence of the sense organs. 
Because of the normality of these determining factors, their in-
e~itable participation in the process of perception. perception becomes 
1. Epistemology, P. Coffey, Vol. II, pp. 95-110. 
2. Idem, p. 98. 
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necessarily direct and immediate. We ignore the normal influence. We 
ignore what we are not immediately aware of. This includes the datum as 
far as perception is concerned. The datum is revealed only upon reflec-
tion; so are the influences of the organism. In perception we are not 
conscious of the influence of the sense organs. neither of the datum. 
What we perceive directly and immediately. and consciously. is the exter• 
nal object as it is. 
Perception must be direct if knowledge of object perceived is to be 
valid. If perception is other than direct. knowledge. valid knowledge. 
of external object is absolutely impossible. But even the pepresenta-
tionist will admit he has valid knowledge. certitude. What truth-value 
would there be to e.n idea if the percept from which it is abstracted 
were not an accurate representation of the extramental object? None. 
Even lack of •concommittant variation" in perceptions does not 
invalidate the theory of perceptionism. When I perceive the straight 
stick I apprehend it directly and immediately. and spontaneously judge 
it to be straight. I cannot perceive in any other way. I must see 
it as it appears to the sense of vision. After the stick has been 
immersed in water. I perceive directly and immediately the stick as 
crooked. I must perceive it thus because that is the way in which it 
appears to me under those conditions. And that is the way in which the 
senses present the stick to me. There is no error involved because the 
senses do not err because they do not judge. Error lies solely in judg-
ment. And the senses only present what is before them; they do not 
judge. therefore they do not err as the representationist would have us 
believe. 
The perceptionist, as Scholastics generally hold, says NIHIL EST IN 
INTELLECTU QUOD NON PRIUS FUERIT I~ SENSU. The representationist reverses 
this and says:- NIHIL EST IN SENSU QUOD NON PRIUS FUERIT IN INTELLECTU. 
That is, of course, presuming that the datum involves the intellect. 
Representationists, taken as a whole, are mediate perceptionists. a 
typical exponent of this group says: " • • • perception is a mediate pro-
cess and not an event in which the thing is revealed as it is."1 Another 
spokesman for this group, but speaking in differnt words, says: • ••• 
we, once stimulated from without, draw our appreciation of what things 
are from within.2 Mediate perception with the representationist menas 
that the object of direct and immediate awareness, apprehension, is the 
datum. From the datum, using the principle of causality, or the prin-
ciple of similarity of effect to cause, the external object is inferred. 
Thus it is maintained that. t.hie e~ternal object is mediately perceived. 
But mediate perception? This is a contradiction in terms. 
Supposing the above few sentences to be true for the moment, the 
representationist has this difficulty to solve: In every mediate percep-
tion reason is an indispensable factor. But animals have no reason. 
Therefore animals have no mediate perception. Since an human being ~us 
his rationality, is identical with an animal, anhuman baing has no mediate 
perception. If perception is not mediate, there is no other alternative, 
as far as is known to philosophy up to the present time, than that 
perception is immediate. It is generally agreed that animals have no 
1. Critical Realism, Roy Wood Sellars. 
2. Reality and Truth, J. G. Vance, p. 212. 
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faculty of reasoning. Yet they perceive. Now if they perceive and have 
no reason. th~ must perceive immediately since they have no reasoning 
power. And in human perception no reason is utilized. Therefore human 
beings must perceive immediately. ~en a human perceives. he must perceive 
directly and immediately the object external to him. (We are only speak-
ing of perception of objects external to the perceiving subject.) 
Every human action has a direct stimulus or cause. This stimulus 
or cause immediately precedes the effect or action following. Thus, if 
the representationist position is to be accepted, it necessarily follows 
that when a child reaches for the moon. he ought to reach into the head 
because that is where the object he desires is immediately apprehended. 
The datum is the thing the child reaches for because that is what he per-
ceiYes immediately. The absurdity is &laring. Or for instance, when 
a horse is approaching a water trough, why does he move towards itt If 
representationism is true, the horse ought to try and break entrance into 
the place of existence of the datum. For t,h~t ie"'whet he perceives immed-
iately and that is what he is tending towards. Certainly the represen-
tationist will not say that the horse infers the existence of the exter-
nal trough by the principle of causality. It is extremely evident that 
representationism must step aside to make room for perceptionism. To 
tell the truth. it does not need to step aside for it never held any posi-
tion in actual life and experience. If representationism were true, 
human progress would indeed be considerably hindered, for, if nothing more, 
time is required to perceive the datum and then to infer the object. 
Whereas in perceptionism no time element is appreciated. 
v 
CONCLUSIOB 
We have seen that the object, in perception, is immediately and dir-
ectly apprehended, and not the datum, the means by which the object is 
immediately and directly apprehended. The datum exists end the process 
of perception exists. But these never reach the level of consciousness 
until the subject wills to consider them in reflection. Perception of 
an object must be direot because no reason is involved in the process. 
The representationist claims that his theory is based on the found• 
ation of scientific discoveries. It is true that science has contributed 
much in physics, in chemistry, to physiology in the analysis of sense 
organs, the nervous system, the brain, also to psychology, and to all 
other physical sciences. But what has it done for philosophy! Prac-
tically nothing. Science has added nothing to enable us to understand 
perception differently. It has added nothing to the subject; nothing to 
the object. Where its contributions do come in is in the ~dium between 
the subject and object. But this medium never reaches immediate aware• 
ness in the process of perception. Whether science has enlightened us 
as to the medium or not, perception is still direct and im~edi~te of the 
object. Science has revealed many interesting facts about the constitu• 
tion of the object, but this does ngt alter immediate perception of the 
same object; it adds nothing. When I perceive a red apple I immediately 
apprehend a red apple. That science has discovered vitamins which were 
not known twenty years ago, makes no differance in my direct and immediate 
apprehension of the red apple. Or that this same apple is seventy•five 
to eighty-five per centum water(75-84.6 per cent.), contains three-tenths 
per centum(0.3 per cent.) ash, four tenths per centum(O., per cent.) 
protein, one and two tenths per centum fiber(l.2 per cent.), thirteen 
per centum arbohydrate(l3.0 per cent.), and five tenths per centum fat 
(0.5 per cent.), does not in the least modif1 or transform mw percep-
tion of a red apple. These are very important discoveries in many res-
pects, but despite them, I still perceive directly and immediately a 
red apple. These facts of science are not immediately apprehended in 
perception. Therefore the contributions of science neither remove nor 
add anything, from and to, my direct perception of the red apple. 
These just mentioned are facts pertaining to the object of my percep-
tion. Science has contributed much to our knowledge of the medium 
existing between the object and the perceiving subject. So far as percep-
tion is concerned, this knowledge is never directly apprehended; those 
facts never reach consciousness during the process of perception. 
This is evident to unbiased consideration. 
The representationists try hard to evade the stigma of idealism. 
But so long as they maintain that only the datum is immediately perceived, 
they must accept the penalty. If only the datum, essence, the character-
complex, is immediately apprehended, reality of which the datum is a 
representation, must forever remain unknown and unknowable. 
The representationist admits everything that the peroeptioniAt re-
cognizes; he lives and acts just as the latter lives and acts. But he 
interprets the facts erroneously. Be apprehends immediately only the 
datum, and to avoid being considered an idealist, he attributes the datum 
to a reality external to the abode of his datum. But this is nothing 
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more nor less than a magnanimous idealism. He has no right to accept 
as known or knowable the extramental world, but he does to be in good stand• 
ing with his critics. 
Perceptionism has weathered the storms of many centuries. Why! Be• 
cause its explanation of reality conforms with reality. It takes into 
account the facts disclosed by perception and intellection. Its explan-
ation appeals to and convinces, every normally intelligent human being. 
The red apple exists external to the subjective self. The subject per-
ceives it directly and immediately and apprehends it immediately. Neither 
the dAtum nor the process of perception is denied. But neither the datum 
nor the process of perception is immediately and directly apprehended. 
The object of immediate perception is directly and immediately apprehended. 
Immediate awareness is of the object. All humanity attests to this because 
that is the manner in which external reality is revealed to it. 
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